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Abstract 
We estimate the impact on health care utilization and out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditures of a 
major reform in Thailand that extended health insurance to one-quarter of the population to 
achieve universal coverage while keeping health spending below 4% of GDP. Identification is 
through comparison of changes in outcomes of groups to whom coverage was extended with 
those of public sector employees and their dependents whose coverage was not affected. The 
reform is estimated to have reduced the probability that a sick person goes without formal 
treatment by 3.2 percentage points (11%). It increased the probability of receiving public 
ambulatory care by 2.7 ppt (5%) and of admission to a public hospital by 1 ppt (18%). OOP 
expenditures were reduced by one-third on average, as was the probability of spending more than 
10% of the household budget on health care, while spending at the very top of the OOP 
distribution was reduced by one-half representing substantial reductions in exposure to medical 
expenditure risk. Supply-side measures implemented with the coverage extension are likely to 
have helped realize these effects from an increased, but still very tight, budget. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Thailand achieved universal health insurance in 2001-02 by extending coverage to 18 million 
previously uninsured citizens representing almost one-quarter of the population. At the time, the 
country had a GDP per capita of $5036 (PPP) and was spending only $169 per capita on health 
care.1 Aware of the difficulty of making good on the promise of universal coverage on such a 
tight budget, the coverage expansion was accompanied by supply-side measures intended to 
constrain costs and deliver cost-effective care. We examine whether this major health care reform 
was able to increase access to medical care and improve financial protection against medical 
expenditure risks for Thai citizens without jeopardising the health of the public finances.  
There is increasing advocacy of universal health coverage being recognised as a key development 
goal. It has the backing of the United Nations General Assembly (2012), the World Health 
Assembly (2005; 2011), the World Health Organization (2010; 2013) and the World Bank (2013). 
Governments in low and middle income countries are likely to hear this rallying cry with some 
trepidation of the fiscal consequences of comprehensive social health insurance. Finkelstein 
(2007) estimates that the introduction of Medicare – public health insurance for the elderly in the 
US – increased total spending on hospitals by 37% within five years and, by extrapolation, claims 
that the expansion of health insurance coverage could account for one-half of the sixfold increase 
in real spending on medical care in the US between 1950 and 1990. From the estimated impact of 
the introduction of universal insurance on health care utilization in Japan, Kondo and Shigeoka 
(2013) warn countries contemplating a major expansion of health insurance to expect a “surge in 
health care expenditures.” The large and growing structural deficits of both the US and Japan 
may give politicians in emerging economies pause for thought before following these two 
countries in legislating entitlements to public health insurance. 
In this context, the experience of Thailand is of considerable interest. The 2001 reform aimed at 
universality with respect to both the breadth of population coverage and the depth of services 
covered. The Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) granted entitlement to a near comprehensive 
benefit package of most medical treatments and prescribed medicines to all Thai citizens not 
covered by (formal sector) employment-related public insurance schemes. UCS beneficiaries were 
required to make a copayment of only 30 Baht (~$0.75) per patient contact, from which the 
poor, the elderly and children were exempted, and even this was abolished in 2006.  
Legislating universal coverage is easier than making it effective. A large extension of tax-financed 
entitlements can be expected to release demand to which supply may respond resulting in an 
escalation of public spending on health that may undermine the financial sustainability of the 
policy. Alternatively, if the lid is kept too tightly on medical spending, such that supply cannot 
                                                            
1 Amounts in current (2001) prices and international $ using PPP conversion factors from World 
Development Indicators (www.databank.worldbank.org accessed April 9, 2013).    
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respond to the inflated demand, then the public medical care offered may be grossly lacking in 
quality or accessible only after long delays. In that case, universal coverage will be a chimera. 
Supposed beneficiaries will still have to pay to access effective medical care, or else they will 
forgo care altogether. The impact on health care utilization and financial protection will be 
muted.  
The Thai reform attempted to avoid both scenarios by expanding coverage while maintaining 
tight control of supply and constraining medical prices with the aim of squeezing the most out of 
the resources available. Three features of the reform design were seen as key to the effort to 
constrain costs (Health Insurance System Research Office, 2012). First, a tax-financed single-
payer with a fixed budget had both the incentive to contain costs and the monopsony power to 
constrain payments to health care providers and pharmaceutical suppliers. Second, payment of 
mainly public providers by capitation for outpatient care and prospectively at a fixed price per 
condition (i.e. Diagnostic Related Groups) under a global budget for inpatient care gave 
providers little incentive to inflate demand or deliver treatments of questionable medical 
effectiveness. Third, a gatekeeper, holding the capitation budget, at the district hospital level was 
intended to ration access to expensive tertiary level treatment and shift the balance of care toward 
the primary level.  
Despite these measures, spending on medical care did rise. Total health expenditure per capita 
approximately doubled in real terms between 2001 and 2010 (International Health Policy 
Program, 2011). But GDP per capita also grew at an average rate of 5.2% per annum over this 
period. Health spending relative to GDP increased by little more than half a percentage point and 
was still under 4% in 2010 (ibid). This is a tight budget from which to deliver universal coverage. 
Has it been achieved or have the constraints on public spending left households with limited 
access to quality health care and little financial protection from the costs of seeking effective 
treatment?  
We identify the impact of the UCS reform on health care utilization and household out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures through a difference-in-differences comparison of population groups 
covered by the UCS with a control group of public sector workers and their dependents that had 
coverage prior to the reform. We find that the reform reduced the probability that a sick 
individual goes without ambulatory care by 11% and increased the probability of an inpatient 
admission to a public hospital by 18%. There is no evidence of crowding out of private sector 
care.  
The Thai universal coverage reform is often trumpeted as a success (World Health Organization, 
2010; Health Insurance System Research Office, 2012) but this claim is based simply on upward 
trends in health care utilization and downward trends in household OOP medical spending 
(Limwattananon et al., 2007; Somkotra T, 2008; Damrongplasit, Melnick, 2009; Panpiemras et al., 
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2011; Health Insurance System Research Office, 2012). Gruber et al. (2012) present the only 
other evaluation of the reform’s causal impact on health care utilization. They concentrate on the 
effect on inpatient admissions and attempt to estimate differential effects between those exempt 
and not exempt from the 30-Baht copay. These groups are presumed to correspond respectively 
to those covered by a less well-financed programme for the poor, children and elderly – the 
Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS) – prior to the UCS and others who were previously uninsured 
or held voluntary insurance. The authors find a greater positive impact on the exempt group, 
which is estimated to be even larger for women of childbearing age and infants. Prompted by this 
finding, they use province level data to estimate the impact of the UCS on infant mortality for 
those previously covered by the MWS and find a very large effect. On the basis of these results, 
Gruber et al. argue that the most important component of the Thai reform was not the extension 
of coverage to the previously uninsured but what they consider to be a massive increase in 
funding for those enrolled in the MWS that made their previously nominal coverage effective.  
This interpretation has important implications for international health policy beyond 
understanding what happened in Thailand. It suggests that health care access and health 
outcomes can be dramatically improved by putting more resources into health systems that offer 
subsidized care to poor and vulnerable populations without changing entitlements and extending 
population coverage. This is an interesting hypothesis that deserves attention but it may be 
premature to conclude in its favour. We explain in section 3 that with the data available is it 
difficult to distinguish those previously covered by the MWS from those previously uninsured. 
Further, taking account of cross-subsidization of the MWS in the pre-reform period and of the 
allocation of salary costs, the per capita rise in funding for those previously insured is likely to 
have been much less than the four-fold increase claimed by Gruber et al..  
We estimate the effect of the UCS on the utilization of ambulatory care, as well as inpatient 
admissions, distinguishing between public and private care, and between different levels of care 
within the public sector. The latter reveals that the gatekeeper system appears to have been 
effective in redirecting treatment from higher cost provincial hospitals to district hospitals. 
Ambulatory care has shifted from sub-district health centres to district hospitals, which is 
consistent with patients seeking more effective, now affordable, treatment options. 
This is the first paper to present estimates of the impact of the Thai reform on OOP medical 
spending. We find that the UCS left the probability of a household making any OOP payments 
unchanged but reduced the mean amount spent by those incurring payments by 31%. The effect 
on the 95th percentile of (positive) expenditures is even higher at 51%. Prior to the reform, 5.8 
percent of the target group spent at least one-tenth of their household budgets on health care. 
The UCS reduced these so-called catastrophic health payments by two percentage points. These 
effects suggest that the extension of insurance coverage brought substantial gains in welfare from 
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reduced exposure to medical expenditure risk, consistent with the finding of Finkelstein and 
McKnight (2008) for US Medicare.  
The evidence presented is of direct relevance to the policy discourse arising from the current 
push for universal health coverage being led by the World Health Organization (World Health 
Organization, 2010; The Lancet, 2012). It is more relevant than evidence on the effects of health 
insurance obtained from marginal changes in coverage, even when this is obtained experimentally 
(Newhouse, 1993; Finkelstein et al., 2012), because supply-side responses can make the impact of 
a large scale expansion of coverage disproportionate to that of a small scale increase (Finkelstein, 
2007; Kondo, Shigeoka, 2013). Evidence from a middle-income country that implemented 
universal coverage a decade ago is more relevant to emerging economies contemplating this step 
than is evidence from the experience of the US and Japan fifty years ago (Finkelstein, 2007; 
Finkelstein, McKnight, 2008; Kondo, Shigeoka, 2013), and even from Taiwan (Chen et al., 2007; 
Chou et al., 2011; Chang, 2012; Keng, Sheu, 2013) that implemented universal coverage in 1995 
at a much higher level of income than that of Thailand in 2002. Our evidence is distinguished 
from that obtained from major expansions of health insurance in the middle income settings of 
Colombia and Mexico not only by geography and the lower income of Thailand, but also by the 
nature of the reform in Colombia, which offered a means-tested subsidy for the purchase of 
private insurance covering care at a restricted network of providers (Miller et al., 2012), and the 
nature of the evidence in Mexico, which comes from an experiment that offers only a ten-month 
window within which to identify the effect on treated individuals offered the opportunity to 
voluntarily enroll relative to controls (King et al., 2009; Barofsky, 2011). Evidence from China 
informs of effects of insurance when, unlike in Thailand, the provider payment system gives little 
incentive to deliver cost-effective care (Wagstaff, Lindelow, 2008; Wagstaff et al., 2009). 
With the exceptions of evaluations of universal coverage reforms in Massachusetts (Kolstad, 
Kowalski, 2012) and Japan (Kondo, Shigeoka, 2013), most studies are restricted to identifying the 
impact of an extension of public insurance to certain demographic or income groups. Since the 
Thai UCS covers all citizens not in the formal employment sector, we can estimate differential 
effects by age, poverty status and urban/rural location.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the organization and financing 
of health care in Thailand before and after the UCS reform. Section 3 describes the empirical 
strategy and data used to identify the effects on utilization and presents the results obtained. 
Section 4 presents analysis of effects on household OOP medical spending. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. THE THAI HEALTHCARE SYSTEM  
2.1 Before universal coverage 
Over four decades prior to the introduction of the UCS in 2001, the supply of health care 
increased substantially. By 1977 there was a provincial hospital in all 76 provinces and rapid 
building of district hospitals had begun. In the ten years prior to the UCS reform around 150 
such hospitals were opened (Ministry of Public Health, Various years). The number of doctors 
increased steadily from around 17 per 100,000 population in 1977 to around 30 in 2001 (ibid). 
Nursing staff increased even more dramatically from 40 to 170 nurses per 100,000 population 
(ibid).  
Various public health insurance schemes had succeeded in extending coverage to a substantial 
share of the population even before the introduction of the UCS. Ten years before the reform, 
two-thirds of Thai citizens had no formal health insurance. Just before the reform, this fraction 
had been reduced to less than 30% (Figure 1). The single largest scheme in 2001 was the Medical 
Welfare Scheme (MWS) that entitled the elderly (60+), children (<12, and secondary school 
students), the poor, and the disabled to comprehensive free care in public facilities.2 This tax-
financed scheme covered 32% of the population in 2001. In 1998, the average annual budget per 
enrollee was just 273 Baht (~$6.82), raising concerns of severe underfunding (Donaldson et al., 
1999; Pannarunothai, 2002).3 To fill the financing gap, provincial health authorities and hospital 
staff redirected substantial funds from general budgets and other public schemes. As a result of 
this cross-subsidization, it is estimated that MWS expenditure per enrollee was around 70% 
greater than the official budget (Donaldson et al., 1999). The funding increase to provide care for 
those moving from MWS to UCS coverage was substantial but much less than the fourfold rise 
apparent from the comparison of official per capita subsidies cited by Gruber et al (2012).  
The second largest program prior to the UCS was the Voluntary Health Card Scheme (VHCS) 
covering 21% of the population in 2001. For 500 Baht ($12.50) per year, households could 
purchase a health card that entitled up to 5 household members to free care at public facilities. 
The private contribution was matched by a 1,000 Baht tax-financed government subsidy. With 
over four enrollees per card on average, the VHCS budget was often insufficient to provide 
adequate care and, similar to the MWS, there was substantial cross-subsidisation (Donaldson et 
al., 1999). 
The Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) is tax-financed and provides free care at 
public facilities for active and retired government employees, their spouses, parents, and up to 
three of their children below the age of 21. It covered 8.5% of the population in 2001. Operating 
under an uncapped fee-for-service system with a generous benefit package, CSMBS spending per 
                                                            
2 Army veterans, monks and village leaders and their dependents also had MWS entitlement. 
3 Salary costs were not covered from this budget. 
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capita was almost 2,500 Baht ($62.50) per enrollee in 1998 (Donaldson et al., 1999). Finally, the 
Social Security Scheme (SSS) covers salaried private sector employees but not their dependents. 
In April 2002, just around the time of the completion of the UCS-reform, the restriction that the 
SSS covered only enterprises with ten or more employees was removed. 
The 18 million Thais that remained without health insurance coverage in 2001 could access 
healthcare in two ways. First, they could purchase care out-of-pocket at private or public 
facilities. Second, the so-called Type B Exemption enabled public health facility staff to exercise 
discretion in granting free or subsidized care to apparently poor individuals with no proof of 
MWS membership. Type B Exemption expenditure amounted to about 2% of total public health 
expenditure in 1997 (Donaldson et al., 1999). 
Without overlooking considerable achievements in the provision of health care and the extension 
of population coverage, there were structural weaknesses in the Thai healthcare system at the 
turn of the millennium. Almost 30% of the population had no insurance coverage and 
underfunding of the MWS and the VHCS left many poor and near-poor with a lack of effective 
coverage. Targeting of the MWS on the poor, elderly and children was far from perfect 
(Kongsawat et al., 2000) and the voluntary nature of the VHCS left it vulnerable to adverse 
selection (Donaldson et al., 1999). The system was also characterized by large and persistent 
regional disparities in both resources and health outcomes (Wibulpolprasert, 2002). 
 
 
Fig. 1: Percentage of population uninsured and covered by each public health insurance 
scheme 
Source: Authors’ estimates using Health and Welfare Surveys 
Notes: Sample weights applied. MWS – Medical Welfare Scheme, VCHS – Voluntary Health Card 
Scheme, UCS – Universal Coverage Scheme, SSS – Social Security Scheme, CSMBS – Civil 
Servants Medical Benefit Scheme. 
 
2.2 After universal coverage 
On coming to power in January 2001, the populist Thai Rak Thai party immediately embarked on 
an ambitious health reform. Starting in April 2001 with the introduction of the UCS in 6 pilot 
provinces, the scheme was expanded to cover 15 provinces in June 2001 and the remaining 
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provinces by October of that year. The rollout was completed within a year with the inclusion of 
the capital Bangkok in April 2002. The UCS covers all Thai citizens not covered by the 
employment-based schemes – the CSMBS and SSS. The percentage of the population covered by 
some form of health insurance jumped from 71% in 2001 to 95% in 2003, and by 2011 coverage 
had risen to over 98% (Figure 1). 
Beneficiaries of the UCS are entitled to inpatient treatment, ambulatory care and medicines 
(prescribed) at facilities within a local provider network. The benefit package is near 
comprehensive. It includes high-cost treatments like open-heart surgery and chemotherapy.4 
Medicines can be prescribed from the National List of Essential Medicines, which contains a 
large proportion of generics. Fully tax-financed, the UCS initially levied a fixed charge of 30 Baht 
(~$0.75) per service contact on a little more than half of its enrollees. Those meeting the criteria 
of the former MWS were exempt from this charge. This charge was abolished in 2006 and 
reinstated in 2012, but rather symbolically with payment being voluntary.  
On top of the coverage extension, the reform made substantial changes to the financing and 
organization of the public healthcare system. These were largely motivated by an awareness of 
the difficulty of achieving a balance between making universal coverage effective on a modest 
budget and preventing medical spending from rocketing in response to a huge expansion of 
coverage (Health Insurance System Research Office, 2012). The main ingredients of the supply 
side measures were: i) a closed-end capitation-based budget; ii) gatekeeper control of access to 
specialist care; iii) prospective payment of hospitals for inpatient treatment; and, iv) from 2006, a 
single public purchaser of care and medicines for UCS beneficiaries. 
Consistent with the aims of increasing the role of primary care and containing costs, the 
backbone of the reformed system is the Contract Unit for Primary Care (CUP), which typically 
consists of a district hospital and affiliated health centers. Most CUPs consist of a network of 
public facilities, except in some parts of large cities where demand is estimated to exceed the 
capacity of public providers and adequate private provision is available.5 The CUP issues a UCS 
gold card to residents of its catchment area that gives entitlement to care within the network. 
Access to other CUPs and higher level providers, including provincial hospitals, requires referral 
from the CUP of residence (Hughes, Leethongdee, 2007; Hughes et al., 2010).  
Outpatient and preventive care are paid for from a capitation budget allocated to CUPs. 
Hospitals are paid for inpatient care prospectively at rates specific to Diagnostic Related Groups 
                                                            
4 Anti-retroviral treatment and renal replacement therapy have been covered since 2003 and 2008 
respectively. Organ transplantation is one of the few essential treatments still excluded. 
5 In 2010, 55% of the UCS members in Bangkok were registered with private hospitals and clinics. But 
nationally only 5.7% of UCS members are registered with private networks (Health Insurance System 
Research Office, 2012) p.53. 
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(DRG) for referrals made by the CUPs but subject to the global capitation budget.6 Originally, 
salary costs were to be paid from the distributed UCS capitation budget with the intention of 
correcting geographic inequalities in access by providing financial incentives for the 
redeployment of health personnel to understaffed rural regions. This put severe financial strain 
on many urban providers whose entire capitation payment could easily be consumed by salary 
costs at existing staffing levels (Hughes et al., 2010). An intense lobbying effort by the medical 
profession led to a repeal of the new financing arrangement in 2002/3 and a return to salary 
budgets being determined by current staffing levels and administered centrally and separately 
from the service budgets.7  
From the outset, the intention was to achieve a purchaser-provider split but the central 
purchasing authority – the National Health Security Office (NHSO) – did not begin to operate 
until 2006, which is after our estimation period. This agency negotiates the capitation rate with 
the Ministry of Finance annually. Constrained by its budget, the NHSO has an incentive to flex 
its purchasing power to obtain lower prices from service providers and, particularly, suppliers of 
medicines. 
Besides changing the financial architecture of the Thai healthcare system, the reform was 
accompanied by an increase in public health spending. The UCS began with a capitation of 1,202 
Baht ($30.50) in 2001-03.8 In real terms, this had been increased by 6.3% by 2005, the end of our 
study period, and by 71% by 2011 (Health Insurance System Research Office, 2012). Total 
spending on the UCS in 2003 was 35% greater in real terms than total public expenditure on the 
MWS and VHCS schemes it replaced had been in 2001 (International Health Policy Program, 
2011). The increase in expenditure per insured person was much more modest since around 23% 
more of the population was covered by the UCS. There was a sharp rise in real total (and public) 
health expenditure per capita at the time the UCS was introduced between 2001 and 2002 (Figure 
2a). Health expenditures continued to rise, but at a less rapid rate, in the post-reform period, such 
that real total expenditure per capita doubled between 2001 and 2010, and public health 
expenditure per capita increased by almost 170%. With rapid economic growth over this period, 
spending on medical care would most probably have increased even in the absence of the 
coverage extension. As a percentage of GDP, total health expenditure increased by only 0.6 of a 
percentage point from 2001 to 2010 and public health expenditure increased by one percentage 
                                                            
6 In the first year of operation, CPUs could be given the budget for inpatient care, as well that for 
outpatient and preventive care. From 2002-03, PHOs could not pass the inpatient care budget down to 
CUPs (Hughes et al., 2010). 
7 The majority of urban facilities successfully requested emergency funding to cover salary costs in the first 
year of the reform prior to the repeal. Afterwards, the UCS budget was top-sliced to take out a 
contribution toward salary costs. Inconsistent treatment of salary costs is a further reason why it is likely 
that Gruber et al (2012) overstate the funding increase coincident with the move from the MWS to the 
UCS.  
8 Salary costs had to be covered from this budget, initially directly and subsequently through its top-slicing. 
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point (Figure 2b). Extension of coverage to one-quarter of the population has not resulted in an 
explosion of expenditure on medical care, although the increase in public spending is 
undoubtedly contributing to budgetary pressures (Lindelow et al., 2012).  
 
Fig. 2a: Total and public health expenditure Fig. 2b: Total and public health expenditure  
per capita, Baht (2007 prices)   as a percentage of GDP  
 
Source: Thai National Health Accounts 1994-2010 (International Health Policy Program, 2011) 
 
3. UCS IMPACT ON HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION 
The impact of the health insurance extension on the level and pattern of health care utilization is 
contingent on a number of factors. The UCS reduced the price of public care for those 
previously uninsured and it may have increased effective access to quality public care for those 
previously insured through the MWS and the VHCS that were less well-financed. These groups 
are expected to be less likely to forgo care when needed, but also to switch from care paid for 
privately to that provided publicly. The impact on total utilization will depend on the degree of 
crowd-out of private care. The impact on utilization will also depend on the supply side’s ability 
and incentives to respond to the increased demand. We noted in the previous section that 
capacity had been developed over four decades prior to universal coverage, but if the UCS 
budget, and consequently the DRG payment rates, were set too low, then providers would have 
little incentive to respond to any increased demand, which may not even materialize if the 
perception of the quality of care that could be delivered was low (Panpiemras et al., 2011).  
Since the flat rate fee of 30 Baht represented a larger decrease in the price of more expensive 
treatments for those who had to pay prior to the UCS, demand would be expected to shift to 
higher levels of treatment. The CUP gatekeeper was designed to resist any movement toward 
provincial hospitals, and with the DRG prospective payment gave district hospitals, which 
effectively control the CUPs, the financial incentive to provide inpatient treatment rather than 
make referrals to the provincial hospital.  
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3.1 Treatment and Control Groups 
Our strategy for identifying the impact of the UCS on health care utilization is to compare before 
and after differences between population groups whose coverage was changed as a result of the 
reform and beneficiaries of the CSMBS whose coverage did not change. We use data from a 
nationally representative cross-sectional household survey – the Health and Welfare Survey 
(HWS) – conducted by the National Statistical Office (NSO).  
Treatment Group 
The HWS records the health insurance coverage of each household member. Our treatment 
group consists of all individuals not covered by one of the two employment-related schemes 
(CSMBS and SSS) and so entitled to coverage through the UCS. In the pre-UCS period, it 
comprises those covered by the MWS and the VHCS, as well as the uninsured. In the post-UCS 
period, it includes those covered by the UCS and those who remain uninsured because they are 
not yet registered with a CUP. Since the latter are part of the target population, they belong to 
the treatment group under the intention-to-treat principle.  
Gruber et al. (2012) use the same dataset and essentially the same identification strategy to 
estimate the impact of the UCS on inpatient admissions, but they focus on differential effects by 
pre-reform insurance status. They construct one treatment group from individuals identified in 
the survey as MWS enrollees before the reform plus those reporting to be in the UCS and 
exempt from the 30 Baht copay post-reform (UCSE). Since the criteria for qualification for the 
MWS and the UCS copay exemption were the same, this treatment group is presumed to consist 
of individuals whose nominal coverage did not change but whose effective coverage may have 
increased because the UCS is better financed than was the MWS. A second treatment group is 
constructed by combining VHCS enrollees and the uninsured pre-reform with those reporting to 
be in the UCS and not exempt from the copay post-reform (UCSP). The separation of these two 
treatment groups may be problematic. Inefficiency of the MWS in targeting the poor was one 
motivation for the reform. If there was any difference in the target efficiency of the two schemes, 
then survey participants identified as MWS enrollees in the pre-reform period will not 
correspond to those reporting UCSE coverage in the post-reform period. The 2003 HWS data 
reveal, for example, that 15% of the formerly uninsured became UCSE beneficiaries. Differences 
in the composition of the specific treatment groups over time potentially invalidate the 
difference-in-differences identification strategy. Relying on reported UCS exemption status can 
also be problematic. While all children automatically became UCSE beneficiaries through the 
reform, 92% of the children of UCSP parents are reported as UCSP in the HWS.  
Because differential pre-reform coverage is related to demographics and income levels, we 
present separate estimates of the impact of the UCS for children (<16), working-age adults (16-
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59), and the elderly (60+), and for the poor and non-poor9. Since geographic reallocation of 
resources was an original aim of the reform, we also distinguish between rural and urban 
dwellers. 
Control group 
Individuals belonging to the CSMBS, either as a government employee, a retiree from public 
sector employment or a dependent of one of those two populations, form our control group. 
Their insurance status did not change with the introduction of the UCS. Between 2001 and 2005, 
our period of analysis, there were no changes to the CSMBS and the proportion of the 
population covered by it varied by just over one percentage point. The expansion of the SSS 
around the time of the UCS reform to cover all formal private sector employees and the resulting 
increase in the proportion of the population covered by it implies a change in the composition of 
beneficiaries. For this reason, we do not include individuals covered by SSS in the control group. 
Those reporting coverage by private insurance, employer benefits and other insurance types 
(2.1% in 2001) are also dropped from the estimation sample. 
3.2 Data 
Our analysis uses one cross-section of the HWS before the introduction of the UCS (2001) and 
three cross-sections afterwards (2003, 2004 and 2005). The estimation sample size in 2001 
(203,106) is about three times larger than that in each of the post-UCS waves, giving us an 
approximately equal number of observations pre- and post-reform (Table 1). The 2001 wave was 
conducted between April and June, before the nationwide implementation of UCS in October.10 
Implementation began in April 2001 in six pilot provinces. With utilization of ambulatory and 
inpatient treatment recorded for the previous two weeks and one year respectively, recall periods 
for some pilot province observations span both pre and post reform. UCS was, however, not 
effectively implemented in the pilot provinces at the time of the survey. We thus treat all 2001 
data as pre-reform. 11  
Analysis of health care utilization is at the individual level. The HWS records whether each 
household member had used each of various types of ambulatory care and whether s/he has had 
an inpatient admission in the last year. The information on ambulatory care is routed through a 
question about whether an illness that is considered not to have required hospitalization has been 
experienced. The recall period for this question is two weeks in 2001 and one month in 2003-
                                                            
9 Broadly consistent with the official poverty rate during our observation period, we define the poor as 
those in the bottom tertile of per capita household income distribution.  
10 In all other waves used, sampling was conducted in April only. We deal with any seasonal effects by 
entering two indicators in the regressions for observations sampled in May and in June. 
11 Observations from the pilot provinces make up 7.2% of the 2001 sample of which only 11.5% identified 
themselves as UCS enrollees. Redefining these observations as being within the treatment period for the 
estimation of effects on ambulatory utilization, for which the recall period was two weeks, had no impact 
on the estimates. Our results are also robust to exclusion of observations from the pilot provinces. 
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2005. We rely on year effects to take account of this inconsistency. Since this change coincides 
with the reform, identification of the effect of the latter relies on the assumption that the change 
in recall period affects the responses of treatment and control observations equally. There are no 
obvious reasons to doubt this. We further reduce the importance of the change in the sickness 
recall period by modeling the probability of using ambulatory care given reported illness. The 
number of different providers that a respondent reporting an illness could identify in the survey 
increased from two to three in 2003. Again, we must rely on year effects and the assumption that 
any effect of this change on reporting is the same for the treatment and control groups.  
For the subsample reporting illness, we test for UCS effects on three categories of ambulatory 
care. The first category indicates if an individual has forgone care, self-medicated (retail 
pharmacies, drug vendors, herbal medicines) or visited a traditional healer but has received no 
formal treatment from a public facility or private clinic. We refer to this category as no formal 
ambulatory care hereafter. The second category indicates if an individual received care from formal 
private providers but did not visit a public facility and the third corresponds to receipt of any care 
from a public provider. Because the UCS reform reduced the price and/or increased the funding 
of care mainly provided at public facilities for the treatment group (see footnote 5), we expect it 
to result in a switch from the first and second categories to the third.   
Separately for the treatment and control groups, Table 2 shows pre- and post-reform sample 
proportions reporting sickness and, conditional on reporting sickness, the proportions in each of 
the three categories of ambulatory care. The proportion reporting sickness rises by about 30% 
for both the treatment and control groups, presumably attributable to the aforementioned longer 
recall period in the post UCS surveys. The proportion with no formal ambulatory care is higher 
in the treatment group in both periods but drops significantly, by almost three percentage points, 
only for this group after the reform. For both groups, utilization of private care rises and 
utilization of public care falls. The decrease in the probability to use public care is substantially 
larger for the control group (4.8 percentage points) than it is for the treatment group (1.6) and 
almost entirely eliminates the pre-reform difference between the two groups.12 
For the subsample visiting a public facility, we investigate whether the pattern of utilization 
across levels of care changes differently between treatment and control groups. We distinguish 
between visits to i) a health center but no other public facility, ii) a district hospital but not to a 
provincial or university hospital, and iii) a provincial or university hospital. Because the reform 
reduced the relative price of higher level treatments but made district hospitals the point of entry 
                                                            
12 Gruber et al (2012) conduct an uncontrolled difference-in-differences analysis of the probability of using 
ambulatory care. They do not condition on the reporting of illness and so the changes in utilization rates 
reflect the change in sickness recall period. Neither do they distinguish between types of ambulatory care. 
Compared with the CSMBS conrol group, they find that the rise in utilization of any ambulatory care is 
significantly greater for their treatment group presumed to be previously covered by the MWS and is 
significantly lower for those presumed previously to be uninsured or covered by the VHCS.  
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to even higher levels of care, we expect both upstream (from health centers) and downstream 
(from provincial/university hospitals) shifts of ambulatory care towards district hospitals.  
 
Table 1: Probability of reporting illness and ambulatory care utilization 
 Pre-UCS
(2001) 
Post-UCS
(2003-05) 
Difference Sample size   
(by group) 
Proportion reporting illnessa 
Treatment  
(Uninsured/MWS/VHCS/UCS) 
.1640
(.0009) 
.2057
(.0010) 
.0418*** 
(.0014) 
326,213
Control (CSMBS)  .1516
(.0021) 
.2037
(.0024) 
.0520*** 
(.0031) 
59,171 
Sample size (by period) 203,106 182,278  385,384
Proportion of ill obtaining 
  no formal ambulatory careb     
Treatment  .2966
(.0027) 
.2692
(.0025) 
-.0274*** 
(.0037) 
59,887 
Control  .2286
(.0062) 
.2258
(.0054) 
-.0029 
(.0083) 
10,483 
  ambulatory care at public facility   
Treatment  .5456
(.0030) 
.5294
(.0028) 
-.0162*** 
(.0041) 
 
Control  .5679
(.0073) 
.5200
(.0065) 
-.0479*** 
(.0098) 
 
  ambulatory care at a private facility only   
Treatment  .1534
(.0021) 
.1861
(.0022) 
.0327*** 
(.0031) 
 
Control  .1956
(.0059) 
.2243
(.0054) 
.0287*** 
(.0080) 
 
Sample size (by period) 32,931 37,439        70,370 
   
Proportion of those obtaining public care treated at 
  health center    
Treatment  .3242
(.0038) 
.3776
(.0038) 
.0534*** 
(.0053) 
32,163 
Control  .0629
(.0048) 
.1202
(.0059) 
.0574*** 
(.0076) 
5,670 
  district hospital    
Treatment  .2865
(.0036) 
.4162
(.0038) 
.1297*** 
(.0053) 
 
Control  .2260
(.0082) 
.3214
(.0084) 
.0954*** 
(.0118) 
 
provincial/university hospital    
Treatment  .3893
(.0039) 
.2062
(.0031) 
-.1831*** 
(.0050) 
 
Control  .7111
(.0089) 
.5583
(.0090) 
-.1528*** 
(.0126) 
 
Sample size (by period) 18,069 19,764       37,833 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Health and Welfare Survey. 
Notes: a Reporting illness considered not to require hospitalization. Two-week recall period in 2001 HWS, 
one-month recall period in 2003-05 HWS. b Includes not seeking any care, self-medication, retail 
pharmacies drug vendors, herbal medicines, and traditional healers.  
Categories are mutually exclusive within each panel. Visit to a private facility excludes those also visiting 
any public facility. Health center excludes those also visiting a higher level public facility. District hospital 
excludes those also visiting a provincial/university level hospital. Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses. *** Indicates that the difference over time is significantly different from zero at 1%. 
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Patterns of utilization differ strikingly by insurance coverage (Table 2, bottom panel). Individuals 
in the treatment group are much more likely to use health centers and district hospitals and so are 
much less likely to visit provincial hospitals than those covered by the CSMBS. Post-reform, for 
both groups, the proportions using health centers and district hospitals increase. The increase in 
the probability to visit a district hospital and the decrease in the probability to visit a provincial 
hospital are both greater in magnitude for the treatment group, which is consistent with the UCS 
shifting the pattern of care toward the lower level hospitals. 
In the 2001 and 2003 surveys, respondents were asked whether they had any inpatient admission 
in the last year and, if so, to which type of hospital. From 2004, the respondent could report 
admissions to up to three types of hospitals.13 For the 2004-05 cross-sections, we use all 
admissions reported and rely on the year dummy variables to absorb the effect of this change in 
the question. We distinguish between no admission, admission to a private but not a public 
hospital, and any inpatient stay in a public hospital. If the UCS reform succeeded in making 
inpatient care affordable to individuals who would otherwise have forgone treatment, then 
admissions to public facilities will have risen. In addition, if individuals who could otherwise 
afford inpatient treatment in private hospitals are induced by the lower relative price and better 
funding to switch to public hospitals, then there will be a crowding-out effect on private care. 
Table 2: Probability of inpatient admission 
  Pre-UCS
(2001) 
Post-UCS
(2003-05) 
Difference Sample size 
(by group) 
Proportion admitted to  
  public hospital   
Treatment  .0560 
(.0006) 
.0607 
(.0006) 
      .0047*** 
(.0008) 
326,213 
Control  .0801 
(.0016) 
.0805 
(.0016) 
.0005 
(.0022) 
59,171 
  private hospital     
Treatment  .0064 
(.0002) 
.0070 
(.0002) 
   .0006** 
(.0003) 
 
Control  .0089 
(.0005) 
.0093 
(.0006) 
.0004 
(.0008) 
 
Sample size (by period) 203,106 182,278  385,384 
Proportion of those admitted to public hospital treated at a district hospital
Treatment  .3284 
(.0048) 
.4947 
(.0052) 
     .1664*** 
(.0070) 
18,990 
Control  .1862 
(.0079) 
.2915 
(.0094) 
    .1053*** 
(.0123) 
4,752 
Sample size (by period) 12,102 11,640  23,742 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Health and Welfare Survey. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** (**) indicates that the difference over time is 
significantly different from zero at 1% (5%). 
There is a significant increase in the probability of admission to a public hospital in the treatment 
group, but not the control group, after the UCS reform (Table 2). There is a significant increase 
in the probability of admission to a private hospital also only in the treatment group, which is not 
                                                            
13 In the 2004-05 data, 18% of those with at least one admission report additional hospital stays. 
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consistent with a crowding-out effect.14 Furthermore, the second panel of the table shows that a 
much higher proportion of individuals in the treatment group use district hospitals rather than 
provincial or university hospitals and that, consistent with the gatekeeper role of district hospitals 
in the UCS, there is an increase in the probability to be admitted to this type of hospital after the 
reform that is greater for the treatment group than for the control group.  
3.3 Estimation 
For the sample reporting a sickness not considered to have required hospitalization, we estimate 
a multinomial logit (MNL) model of the three mutually exclusive categories of ambulatory care: 
no formal ambulatory care  1 1ity  , care at a private clinic or hospital but not at a public facility 
 2 1ity   and care at a public facility  3 1ity  , where i and t are indicators of individuals and 
time respectively. Probabilities of these three outcomes are defined as 
        3
1
exp
1 .
exp
it j
itj j it
it k
k
P y

   

X θ
X θ
X θ
     (1) 
We set the no formal care option as the reference ( 1 0θ ) and define the linear index as follows, 
  , 2,3it j j it j it t j tjD D UC j       itX θ Z γ     (2) 
where itD  is a dummy variable indicating membership of the target treatment group 
(MWS/VHCS /uninsured/UCS), tUC is an indicator of the post-treatment period (>2001), tj  is 
a year effect15 and itZ is a vector of control variables included to increase precision and to allow 
for any differences between the treatment and control groups in trends in observable 
determinants.16 The effect of the UCS on the probability of each of the three possible outcomes 
for the target treatment group at the time of treatment is given by (Puhani, 2012) 
      1 , 1,2,3itj j t UC j t UCP y j           α β δ α δit itZ γ Z γ   (3) 
where t UC is some point in the post-reform period. We compute these effects by averaging 
over observations in the UCS target group within the post-UCS period (2003-05). 
                                                            
14 Identification of the crowding-out effect is subject to the caveat that a minority of UCS enrolees (5.3% 
in 2010) have access to a private provider network that contracts with the NHSO. 
15 Month effects are also included to take account for the sampling undertaken in May and June (in 
addition to April) in 2001 only. 
16 For the full sample, and separately by treatment status, Appendix Table A1 reports means of the control 
variables. The observed employment and occupation differences between treatment and control groups 
derive from the fact that the UCS covers those outside the formal employment sector. The control group 
contains non-public sector workers because CSMBS coverage extends to public sector retirees and 
dependents of public sector workers. The 2.3% of individuals who report to be public employees not 
covered by the CSMBS could either be temporary public workers or the result of misreporting. Besides the 
occupation differences, individuals in the treatment group are on average younger, less likely to live in 
urban areas and less educated than individuals in the control group. 
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We estimate analogous models for the type of public facility used by those with any ambulatory 
visit to a public facility (health center only (reference) vs. district hospital (but not provincial 
hospital) vs. provincial hospital) and for inpatient care (no admission (reference) vs. admission to 
a private (but not a public) hospital vs. admission to a public hospital). For those admitted to a 
public hospital, we estimate a binary logit model for admission to a district hospital as opposed to 
a provincial or university hospital. 
Adoption of the multinomial logit model implies the potentially restrictive Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption (McFadden, 1984). For example, the relative probability 
of seeking ambulatory care at a private clinic as opposed to forgoing formal treatment may not be 
independent of the availability and quality of the third treatment option from public facilities. 
While the mixed logit (McFadden, Train, 2000) would be an attractive more flexible alternative, 
identification of this model is likely to prove difficult in the absence of covariates that are specific 
to the care options. The nested logit (McFadden, 1984) also succeeds in relaxing the IIA 
assumption but requires imposition of a hierarchy that may not be consistent with actual choices. 
For example, one could assume that there is a first stage decision to seek any formal sector 
ambulatory care followed by a second stage decision to seek care from either a public or private 
sector facility. But for some, perhaps poor and rural dwellers, the only feasible choice may be 
between no treatment and care at an inexpensive local public health center. We prefer to avoid 
the risk of misspecification arising from the imposition of incorrect hierarchies.17  
3.4 Results  
Ambulatory Care 
In Table 3 we present the estimated effects of the UCS on the probability of: i) reporting an 
illness not requiring hospitalization (top panel); ii) each of the three defined ambulatory treatment 
responses to such an illness (middle); and, iii) for the subsample utilizing public care, visiting each 
of the three types of public provider (bottom). There is a significant effect on the probability of 
reporting illness only for the poor. The absence of any significant impact on reported illness for 
the full sample and all other sub-samples suggests that no selection bias is induced by estimating 
the effect of the UCS on ambulatory care utilization among those reporting illness. The increased 
likelihood of the poor to report illness could be because sickness is more likely to be 
acknowledged when there is an opportunity to seek treatment. But it could also be that the poor 
respond differentially to the extension of the recall period. In any case, we concentrate on the 
treatment response conditional on reported illness. 
 
                                                            
17 We have estimated the impact of the UCS on all utilization outcomes using the linear probability model 
(LPM) of binary choices. Qualitatively, and for the most part quantitatively, LPM estimates are consistent 
with those presented from the multinomial and binary logits. 
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Table 3: Average effects of the Universal Coverage Scheme on the probability of 
reporting an illness and receiving ambulatory care  
 All Children Adult Elderly Rural Urban Poor Non-
Poor 
Report illness .0023 
(.0037) 
-.0107 
(.0081) 
-.0056 
(.0047) 
.0165 
(.0104) 
.0091 
(.0080) 
-.0051 
(.0041) 
.0211** 
(.0101) 
-.0033 
(.0038) 
Sample size 152,842        
Given illness, probability of receiving:
no formal care -.0321*** 
(.0097) 
-.0308 
(.0194) 
.0007 
(.0150) 
-.0720*** 
(.0169) 
-.0458** 
(.0191) 
-.0254** 
(.0119) 
-.0667*** 
(.0220) 
-.0226** 
(.0111) 
public care .0270** 
(.0106) 
.0069 
(.0250) 
-.0063 
(.0154) 
.0805*** 
(.0183) 
.0258 
(.0216) 
.0250** 
(.0123) 
.0662*** 
(.0239) 
.0105 
(.0119) 
private care .0052 
(.0079) 
.0238 
(.0202) 
.0056 
(.0114) 
-.0086 
(.0126) 
.0199 
(.0151) 
.0005 
(.0105) 
.0004 
(.0145) 
.0120 
(.0100) 
Sample size 29,411        
Given receive public care, probability of treatment at:
health center -.0692*** 
(.0220) 
-.0376 
(.0493) 
-.1102***   
(.0342) 
-.0314 
(.0364) 
-.0712* 
(.0393) 
-.0431* 
(.0229) 
-.0899* 
(.0478) 
-.0762***   
(.0245) 
district hospital .1048*** 
(.0192) 
.0400 
(.0431) 
.1588***   
(.0304) 
.0751** 
(.0312) 
.0781** 
(.0353) 
.0932*** 
(.0211) 
.1124*** 
(.0432) 
.1117***   
(.0214) 
provincial/university 
hospital
-.0355*** 
(.0100) 
-.0023 
(.0208) 
-.0485***   
(.0163) 
-.0438**   
(.0171) 
-.0070 
(.0152) 
-.0501*** 
(.0146) 
-.0225 
(.0161) 
-.0354***   
(.0137) 
Sample size 16,664        
Notes: Estimates are average treatment effects on the treated in the post-treatment period derived from 
binary (top panel) and multinomial logit (middle and bottom panels) model estimates. Models include the 
control variables listed in Table A1, plus indicators of province, year, month and treatment/control group. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Sample sizes give the number of treated observations in the post-treatment period over which 
the treatment effects are averaged. The estimation samples are larger including control observations and 
treated observations in 2001 and correspond to the sum of the pre- and post-UCS observations given in 
Table 1. Sub-sample sizes are given in Appendix Table A2. 
The introduction of the UCS is estimated to have reduced the probability of going without 
formal ambulatory care when sick by 3.2 percentage points (11%) on average, an effect primarily 
driven by an increase in the probability of seeking care at a public facility. There is no evidence of 
the UCS resulting in the crowding out of private ambulatory care in the full or any sub-samples, 
although it should be kept in mind that a minority of UCS beneficiaries are registered with a 
private provider network. The shift from no formal ambulatory care to treatment at public 
facilities is confined to the elderly, for whom the UCS increased the probability of receiving 
public care by 8 percentage points (13%). The elderly were, in principle, exempt from user fees 
both before (through the MWS) and after the introduction of the UCS. Apparently the MWS did 
not provide effective coverage to the elderly component of its target population. MWS targeting 
of the elderly was indeed very poor with about one-third of this group not enrolled (Donaldson 
et al., 1999). However, MWS targeting of children was also deficient and the UCS did extend 
coverage to many working-age adults. The degree of coverage increase does not seem sufficient 
to explain why the impact on ambulatory care is restricted to the elderly. An additional 
explanation is that the greater morbidity among the elderly implies a larger pool of unmet need 
for any given degree of underinsurance. It may also be the case that the elderly attached greater 
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stigma to the MWS, widely perceived as the poor man’s scheme, and so reacted more strongly to 
the UCS entitlement granted to all citizens. 
In rural areas, it is estimated that the UCS reduced the probability of going without formal care 
by 4.6 percentage points (17%). The effect is driven by almost equally sized non-significant 
increases in the probabilities of seeking care at private and public providers. The smaller 
reduction in the probability of forgoing formal treatment in urban areas derives solely from 
increased utilization of public facilities. The UCS is estimated to reduce the probability that the 
poor sick go without formal treatment by 6.7 percentage points (25%). The effect on the non-
poor is one-third of this magnitude.  
Conditional on receiving ambulatory care in the public sector, the location of treatment shifts 
from health centres and provincial hospitals to district hospitals. The (conditional) probability of 
being treated at a district hospital is raised significantly in the full sample (11 ppt, 38%) and for all 
subsamples, except for children. With the exceptions of the elderly and urban subsamples, the 
shift in treatment is mainly from health centres to district hospitals. This is consistent with the 
larger price reduction of district hospital care. It may also reflect the greater budgetary power 
granted to district hospitals under the reformed system and the consequent shift in resources 
toward them that further encourages patients to seek care at that level rather than at insufficiently 
equipped health centers.18 In all but the rural and poor subsamples, which overlap considerably, 
there is statistically significant evidence that the increase in utilization of district hospitals also 
partly stems from reduced use of provincial hospitals. This is consistent with what one would 
expect from the UCS referral system that made district hospitals the point of entry to higher level 
care.  
Inpatient Care  
In Table 4 we present average effects of the UCS on the probability of inpatient admissions in 
the post-reform target population. A clear pattern emerges consistent with increased affordability 
inducing greater inpatient treatment in public hospitals without crowding out care in the private 
sector. On average, the UCS is estimated to raise the probability of receiving inpatient treatment 
by 1 percentage point (18%). Across age groups, the effect varies from 2 percentage points for 
the elderly to 0.6 points for children but in relative terms all effects are in the range of 15% 
(working-age adults) to 18% (children). The effect is just short of significance at 10% for 
children. The larger relative impact on public inpatient care compared to that on ambulatory care 
is presumably due to a greater pre-reform financial barrier to obtaining the former. 
The positive impact of the UCS on the probability of receiving public inpatient care is confined 
to urban settings, where it is 1.1 percentage points (21%). The lack of any significant impact in 
                                                            
18 Hughes et al. (2010) anecdotally report complaints by health centre staff that district hospitals abused 
their new budgetary powers to cut funding for largely preventive care at health centers. 
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rural areas may reflect geographic barriers that continue to block access to care at distant 
hospitals despite the reduced price of treatment, and possibly also the persistence of supply 
constraints as a result of the reform’s failed efforts to redistribute human resources and funds 
towards rural regions. The UCS succeeded in improving access to public inpatient care for both 
the poor and the non-poor. The slightly lower impact on the poor reflects the overlap between 
the poor and rural populations.19  
Table 4: Average effects of the Universal Coverage Scheme on the probability of inpatient 
admission  
 All Children Adult Elderly Rural Urban Poor Non-Poor
public hospital  .0099*** 
(.0020) 
.0059 
(.0037)
.0081***
(.0027) 
.0201***
(.0062) 
.0041
(.0041)
.0114***
(.0022) 
.0089* 
(.0052) 
.0100***
(.0020) 
private hospital .0005 
(.0007) 
.0010 
(.0014)
.0003
(.0009) 
.0008
(.0021) 
-.0009
(.0008)
.0020*
(.0011) 
.0005 
(.0011) 
.0008
(.0009) 
Sample Size 152,809    
 
If public, 
probability treated 
at district hospital 
.0511*** 
(.0176) 
-.0668
(.0482)
.0489**
(.0250) 
.0776***
(.0295) 
.0603*
(.0346)
.0292
(.0204) 
.0864** 
(.0365) 
-.0353*
(.0202) 
Sample size 9,289    
Notes: Estimates are average treatment effects on the treated in the post-treatment period derived from 
multinomial (top panel) logit and logit (bottom panel) model estimates. Notes on control variables, 
standard errors, significance and sample sizes as for Table 3.  
In order to gauge the magnitude of the increase in inpatient treatment relative to the price 
reduction that brings it about, we estimate the impact of the UCS on the mean payment for 
inpatient care in a public hospital using the same years of the HWS and the same empirical 
strategy adopted to identify the impacts on utilization.20 The estimator is the modified two-part 
model described in the next section. We estimate that the UCS reduced the mean payment for 
inpatient treatment across all those in the target population admitted to a public hospital by 14%. 
Setting the estimated 18% increase in the probability of receiving public inpatient care against 
this price reduction implies a price elasticity of -1.29. The price decrease is modest since the 
average includes individuals who made no payment both before and after the reform. These 
individuals were always exempt and if their utilization did not change, then the price elasticity is 
overestimated. Restricting attention to strictly positive payments, the average effect on the 
treated is 37%, which implies a price elasticity of -0.48 if one assumes that the rise in utilization 
comes from individuals who expect to make a reduced positive payment after the reform. Even 
this estimate indicates a substantial degree of price sensitivity.21  
                                                            
19 While not reported in the table, we find a particularly large increase for the urban poor that amounts to 
1.8 percentage points. 
20 This analysis is conducted only for inpatient treatment because the HWS did not collect data on 
payments for ambulatory care prior to 2003. Details of the analysis of payments and the results are 
available from the authors on request. 
21 Both estimates are substantially larger in magnitude than the price elasticity of inpatient care of around -
0.15 estimated from the famous, but now rather dated, RAND Health Insurance Experiment in the US 
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As with ambulatory care, the UCS induced a shift in the location of public inpatient care from 
provincial/university to district hospitals (Table 4). The 5 percentage point (16%) increase in the 
probability of being treated at a district hospital (conditional on being admitted to a public 
hospital) is most likely a result of the new referral system. This relocation of treatment is not 
observed for children and for the non-poor there is a marginally significant reduction in the 
probability of being treated at a district hospital. The reason for the latter effect is not 
immediately obvious. It could be that wealthier individuals are more successful in negotiating 
referral to higher level hospitals possibly being induced to do so by the increased utilization of 
district hospitals. 
4. UCS IMPACT ON OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURES  
4.1 Data and identification strategy 
To estimate the impact of the reform on household OOP medical expenditures we again adopt a 
difference-in-differences strategy, this time using data from the nationally representative 
Socioeconomic Survey (SES) conducted by the NSO. We use the 2000 SES cross-section for the 
pre-UCS period, and the 2004 cross-section for the post-UCS period. Sample sizes are just under 
25,000 households in 2000 and 35,000 households in 2004.  
Medical expenditures are available at the household level. The 2000 SES did not record health 
insurance status and so we use employment sector to proxy insurance coverage. Treatment group 
households are defined as those with no public sector worker and not every member is a private 
sector salaried employee. These households should not be fully covered by either the CSMBS or 
the SSS, although there could be partial coverage from these schemes. This occurs, for example, 
if the household includes a retired civil servant living with his/her adult offspring, if a child of a 
public sector worker does not live in the same household as this parent, or if a formal private 
sector employee lives with dependents. With these exceptions, individuals living in the treatment 
group households belong to the population entitled to UCS coverage. They include the self-
employed, informal workers, unemployed, retired private sector and informal workers, elderly 
and child dependents of these groups and of private salaried employees. Our comparison group 
includes households consisting of a public sector employee(s) and his or her dependents, which 
should be covered by the CSMBS. Households consisting only of formal private sector 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(Manning et al., 1987). The discrepancy could be due to the difference in contexts and the fact that the 
RAND experiment examined response to much more limited variation in prices. Our elasticity estimates 
are broadly consistent with evidence from low and middle income countries. Lavy and Quigley (1993) 
estimate a price elasticity of inpatient care of -1.82 in Ghana in 1987 and the elasticity of both outpatient 
and inpatient care at public hospitals is often estimated to be around unitary or higher in magnitude 
(Gertler et al., 1987; Sauerborn et al., 1994; Sahn et al., 2003; Asfaw et al., 2004; Mocan et al., 2004). A 
recent study of Chile estimates elasticities of ambulatory care of around -2 but of close to zero for specific 
surgeries (Duarte, 2012). 
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employees should be covered by the SSS and are excluded because of the expansion of this 
scheme at the time of the UCS reform.  
Because the 2004 SES wave does identify insurance status, we can check the validity of 
approximating health insurance enrollment by employment sector. The method works quite well. 
Over three-quarters of individuals in households allocated to the treatment group are indeed 
UCS enrollees and the same proportion of the comparison group is covered by the CSMBS 
(Table 5). A further 5% of the treatment group individuals are uninsured and correctly fall into 
the treatment group under the intention-to-treat principle. SSS and CSMBS beneficiaries account 
for 7% and 10% respectively of individuals in the treatment group households. These are the 
exceptions described in the previous paragraph. Moreover, 9% of individuals in the comparison 
group households are enrolled in the SSS and 14% are UCS members. The latter are co-residents 
of public sector workers not covered by the CSMBS: ≥ 4th child, adult offspring, in-laws, siblings 
and non-family household members. The inclusion of these individuals means that we do not 
have a control group of households completely unaffected by the reform. For this reason, we 
refer to a ‘comparison group’ whose exposure to the reform is much less than that of the 
treatment group. If the UCS does provide financial protection from medical expenses, this 
should be apparent from comparisons of changes in household expenditures between the two 
groups. Identification of the effect of differential exposure to the reform is inevitable given 
treatment – insurance status – is defined at the individual level, while the outcome – medical 
expenditures – is measured at the household level.  
Table 5: Percentage of individuals in treatment and comparison households covered by 
each insurance scheme, 2004 
 Treatmenta Comparisonb 
UCS 78.3 14.3
CSMBS 9.6 75.5
SSS 6.7 8.8
Uninsured 5.4 1.4
Sample size 
(households) 
 
30,785 1,631 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Thailand Socioeconomic Survey 2004 
Notes: a All households except those including a public sector employee or including only formal private 
sector employees. b Households including only public employees and their dependents. 
The inclusion of CSMBS/SSS enrollees in the treatment group and of UCS enrollees in the 
comparison group does not necessarily imply that the estimate of the impact of the UCS on 
household medical expenditures will be biased. The impact at the household level will indeed vary 
with the number of individuals in the household with UCS coverage. Eighty-four percent of 
individuals in the treatment group households are in the UCS target population, while the same 
proportion of individuals in the comparison households are not entitled to coverage through the 
UCS. We are identifying the effect of the reform on households whose main health insurance 
entitlement is provided by the UCS relative to households mainly covered by employment-based 
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insurance that does not change. This is an interesting treatment effect, which can be anticipated 
to be smaller than the effect on a household fully covered by the UCS relative to one without any 
coverage from the UCS. But the latter effect is relevant to a much smaller number of households 
than the one we estimate. 
The SES identifies out-of-pocket payments for ambulatory care and medicines in the last month 
and for inpatient care in the last year. No distinction is made between payments for public and 
private care. We compute household per capita expenditures. Pre- and post-reform means for the 
treatment and comparison groups are given in Table 6.  
Table 6: Descriptive statistics – Household OOP medical expenditures per capita  
(per month, Baht constant 2004 prices) 
 Pre-reform
(2000) 
Post-reform
(2004) 
Difference Sample 
size  
Expenditures on medicines 
Proportion making any payment   
Treatment .5541 (.0033) .4659 (.0028) -.0881*** (.0044) 52,964 
Comparison .3407 (.0141) .3120 (.0114) -.0286 (.0181) 2,758 
Mean expenditure if >0        
Treatment 31.97 (0.838) 31.84 (0.745)   -.1305 (1.12) 26,633 
Comparison 68.48 (5.322) 94.30 (10.29) 25.82** (11.58) 893 
Expenditures on ambulatory care 
Proportion making any payment   
Treatment .2936 (.0031) .3291 (.0026) .0355*** (.0041)  
Comparison .2032 (.0120) .2177 (.0102) .0145 (.0158)  
Mean expenditure if >0     
Treatment 203.7 (7.485) 172.2 (5.467) -31.45*** (9.269) 16,643 
Comparison 446.5 (52.20) 523.3 (43.16)  76.82 (67.73) 584 
Expenditures on inpatient care 
Proportion making any payment   
Treatment .0854 (.0019) .1192 (.0018) .0339*** (.0026)  
Comparison .0905 (.0085) .0901 (.0071) -.0004 (.0111)  
Mean expenditure if >0     
Treatment 274.3 (20.75) 227.0 (19.60) -47.25* (28.54) 5,564 
Comparison 443.5 (71.41) 357.2 (82.89) -86.29 (109.4) 249 
Total medical expenditures 
Proportion making any payment       
Treatmenta .7135 (.0030) .6736 (.0027) -.0399*** (.0040)  
Comparisonb .5102 (.0149) .4800 (.0124) -.0301 (.0194)  
Mean expenditure if >0         
UCS 141.5 (4.28) 146.4 (4.78) 4.91 (6.41) 36,561 
CSMBS 302.2 (27.19) 365.6 (27.82) 63.40 (38.90) 1,358 
Medical expenditure / total household expenditure                                                                  
Treatment .0257 (.0004) .0201 (.0003) -.0056*** (.0004)  
Comparison .0130 (.0010) .0138 (.0009)  .0007 (.0010)  
Proportion with (Medical expenditure / total household expenditure)>0.1                             
Treatment .0578 (.0016) .0446 (.0012) -.0131*** (.0020)  
Comparison .0240 (.0046) .0294 (.0042)  .0054 (.0062)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Thailand Socioeconomic Survey. 
Notes: Treatment and comparison households defined as in notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors 
reported in parenthesis. Where sample sizes not given they are as in first two rows. 
Prior to the reform, the treatment group was more likely to pay OOP for medicines in the last 
month. This probability declined for both groups but only significantly so and to a greater degree 
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for the treatment group. Also consistent with an effect of the UCS on spending on medicines, 
the mean positive amount paid remained constant for the treatment group but increased by 37% 
in the comparison group. The probability of paying for ambulatory care in the last month was 
also higher for the treatment group at baseline and it increased only for this group. This is 
consistent with the impact of the UCS on ambulatory care utilization identified in the previous 
section and with the 30 Baht copay per service contact. Indicative of reduced exposure to larger 
expenditures on ambulatory care, the mean positive amount paid by the treatment group fell by 
15%, while it increased (not significantly) by 17% for the comparison group. Before the UCS, the 
treatment and comparison groups faced approximately equal probabilities of incurring OOP 
expenditures on inpatient care over a year. This probability rose only for the treatment group, 
which again is likely to reflect the positive impact of the UCS on admissions combined with the 
30 Baht copay. The mean amount paid for inpatient care fell significantly after the reform only 
for the treatment group, although in relative terms the fall in the sample means is roughly the 
same for both groups. We calculate total household OOP medical expenditure per capita by 
dividing payments for inpatient care reported for one year by 12 and adding this to payments for 
ambulatory care and medicines each reported for the last month, and dividing the result by 
household size. The probability of having any OOP medical spending was higher for the 
treatment group at baseline but declined significantly only for this group indicating that the 
reduced probability of paying for medicines dominates the increases in the probabilities of paying 
for ambulatory and inpatient care. There is no significant increase in the mean OOP payment for 
either group, although the rise in the sample mean is larger for the comparison group. 
The treatment group spends less on health care than the comparison group in absolute terms but 
relative to household budgets, the burden of medical spending is higher for the treatment group, 
which is poorer. Prior to the UCS, the treatment households spent 2.6% of their budgets on 
medical care, on average, compared to only 1.3% for the comparison households. After the 
introduction of the UCS, the mean medical expenditure budget share fell by one-fifth among the 
treatment households and remained constant in the comparison group. Prior to the reform, 5.8% 
of the treatment households spent at least 10% of their budgets on health care – sometimes 
referred to as ‘catastrophic health payments’ (Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, 2003) – compared with 
only 2.4% of comparison households. Exposure to such high relative medical expenditures fell 
only in the treatment group. 
4.2 Estimation 
We estimate modified two-part models (Mullahy, 1998) of household OOP medical expenditures 
(in total and separately for medicines, ambulatory care, and inpatient care). The probability of 
making any payment is modeled by a logit with the linear index specified analogous to equation 
(2) and the partial effect of the reform being analogous to equation (3), which is averaged over 
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the treatment group of households in the post-reform period. The impact on the expectation of 
OOP payments  itm 	over their positive range is estimated by a Generalized Linear Model 
(GLM) with a log link function, 
     0 expit it it it t it tE m m D D UC           Z         (4) 
where, i now indicates a household, ,it tD UC and itZ  are defined as above22, t  is the year effect 
and the error of the model is assumed to follow a gamma distribution.23 The average effect of the 
UCS on mean positive expenditures among those with such spending in the treated population is 
estimated by  
          1 ˆ ˆ ˆˆexp exp 1
D
it t
i SD
ATT
N
   
 
      Z    (5) 
where 
D
S   is the subset of households within the treatment group  1itD   with positive 
expenditures and 
D
N   is the number of such households. We also estimate the average effect on 
positive expenditures relative to the counterfactual of no reform, which is simply the term in 
square brackets in (5).24 The average effect of the UCS on mean expenditures (including zero) 
among the population exposed to the reform is estimated by combining estimates from the two 
parts of the model (Flores et al., 2011). 
We take two approaches to test whether the UCS was successful in reducing exposure to 
particularly high medical expenses, as opposed to merely decreasing the mean amount spent. 
First, we use a logit model – the linear index again specified analogous to (2) – to estimate the 
impact on the probability that the household spends at least 10% of its budget on health care. 
Second, we use the quantile difference-in-differences approach (Athey, Imbens, 2006) to estimate 
effects on conditional (on covariates) quantiles of positive expenditures, concentrating on effects 
at higher quantiles. Each conditional quantile is specified as a linear function analogous to the 
term within parentheses on the right-hand-side of (4). Under the assumption that, in the absence 
of the reform, (conditional) quantile q of positive OOP payments of treated households would 
have changed as did quantile q of payments of comparison households, the effect on that 
quantile is identified by the parameter on the reform indicator  it tD UC , which is estimated by 
the respective quantile regression (Koenker, Basset, 1978). To estimate the relative impact on a 
                                                            
22 Descriptive statistics by treatment and control group of the control variables used in the regression 
analyses reported below are given in Table A3 of the Appendix. 
23 We have also estimated the effect on the log of positive expenditures using ordinary least squares. The 
results are consistent with those obtained from GLM with respect to direction and significance of effects 
and the magnitudes of the relative effects obtained are broadly similar. 
24 An additional advantage of the relative ATT is that it is a function only of the coefficient on the 
treatment indicator and so will be estimated with greater precision than the ATT, which depends on all 
covariates and parameters in the model. 
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conditional quantile, we use the regression estimates to predict expenditure for each household at 
that quantile and average over the treated households in the post-reform period assuming that 
the UCS had not been implemented. We then express the treatment effect on the quantile as a 
proportion of the mean counterfactual prediction. 
4.3 Results 
We present average effects of the UCS on medical expenditures in the post-reform treated 
households in Table 7. There is no significant impact on the probability of incurring any medical 
expenditure, which is the result of a significant reduction in the probability of spending on 
medicines being cancelled by increases in the probability of spending on inpatient and on 
ambulatory (not significant) care. That the UCS significantly increased the probability of 
incurring payments for inpatient care is consistent with our finding of a positive impact on 
inpatient admissions and the small UCS copayment. The offsetting reduction in the probability 
of spending on medicines is consistent with our finding that the reform reduced reliance on self-
medication – included in the ‘no formal treatment’ category in section 3 – and with the inclusion 
of prescribed medicines in the UCS benefit package at no further charge after payment of the 30 
Baht copay for a visit.  
Table 7: Average effects of the Universal Coverage Scheme on household out-of-pocket 
medical expenditure per capita (OOP) 
 Total Medicines Ambulatory 
care 
Inpatient 
care 
Pr(OOP>0) -.0076
(.0171) 
-.0519**
(.0206) 
.0279
(.0206) 
.0438***
(.0141) 
Sample size 30,774  
OOP amount if >0 
ATT -51.84**
(20.48) 
-11.55***
(3.936) 
-63.27** 
(29.69) 
-78.90 
(53.59) 
Relative Effect -.3146***
(.1027) 
-.3106***
(.0877) 
-.3250*** 
(.1249) 
-.3278*
(.1819) 
Sample size 20,731 14,339 10,131 3,671 
OOP amount 
ATT -44.34 -8.980 -19.58 -.4043 
Relative Effect -.3227 -.3847 -.2598 -.0017 
  
Pr(OOP/Total hhold. exp.>0.1) 0.0199*
(0.0103) 
 
Notes: Estimates are average treatment effects on the treated in the post-treatment period derived from 
logit model (top & bottom panels) and GLM (gamma and log link) estimates. Relative effect is the ATT 
relative to the counterfactual prediction of OOP for the treatment group in the post-treatment period in 
the absence of treatment. Models include the control variables listed in Table A3, plus indicators of 
province, year and treatment/comparison group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
not computed for effect OOP amount unconditional on OOP>0, which is a combination of the effects 
from the two parts of the model. Sample sizes give the number of treated observations in the post-
treatment period over which the treatment effects are averaged. The estimation samples are larger 
including comparison observations and treated observations in 2000 – see Table 6. Sample size for bottom 
two panels is the same as the top panel. 
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Among households making some payment, mean medical expenditure per capita is reduced by 
52 Baht ($1.30) per month, or 31%. The impacts on the amounts spent on ambulatory and 
inpatient (not significant) care are larger in absolute terms than that on spending on medicines 
but in relative terms the effects are similar across all categories of expenditure. These are large 
effects considering that they refer to expenditures on both public and private care. Among those 
incurring some medical expenses, the extension of coverage for public care has reduced the total 
amount spent on all types of care and medicines by almost one-third. The 52 Baht reduction in 
total per capita medical expenditure is equivalent to 1.3% of the treatment group’s total 
household per capita monthly expenditure in the post-reform period. 
Taking into account that around one-third of households incur no medical expenses and that the 
reform has no significant impact on this probability, the mean household monthly medical 
expenditure per capita is estimated to be reduced by 44 Baht, or 32%.25 For ambulatory care, 
there is no significant impact on the payment probability and the overall mean payment is 
reduced by 20 Baht per person per month, or 26%. For inpatient care, the increased probability 
to make any payment entirely offsets the reduction in the mean positive amount paid. In relative 
terms, the largest overall effect is on payments for medicines, with the reduced probability of 
spending reinforcing the negative impact on the amount spent to produce a 38% reduction in the 
mean expenditure across all treatment households. 
The probability of spending at least 10% of the household budget on health care is reduced by 2 
percentage points (Table 7, bottom row), which is a very large effect relative to a 5.7% prevalence 
of so-called ‘catastrophic payments’ among pre-reform treatment group households.26 This effect 
may be generated not only through the UCS reducing the numerator of the medical spending 
budget share but also by increasing the denominator. The latter could occur, for example, 
because of a reduction in precautionary saving in response to increased formal health insurance 
coverage. While this indirect effect cannot be ruled out, the other estimates in Table 7 indicate a 
direct effect on medical expenditures.  
The UCS has a significant negative effect on all conditional quantiles estimated (Table 8). In 
absolute terms, the magnitude of the effect increases monotonically moving from the 10th 
quantile to the 95th quantile. This is to be expected given the rise in the level of expenditure 
moving up the distribution. The relative effect increases from a 14% reduction in the 10th 
quantile to a 51% reduction in the 95th quantile. The reform had its greatest impact at the top of 
                                                            
25 We have not computed standard errors for the combined effects across the two parts of the models 
since they would reflect sampling variability of the estimators of all parameters across both parts of the 
model and would also be a function of all covariate values. It is more informative to conduct inference for 
each component of the model separately. 
26 The probability of spending at least 15% of the household budget on health care is reduced by 1.95 ppt 
(significant at 5%), which is a reduction of approximately two-thirds relative to the  pre-reform probability. 
OLS estimates of the effects are very similar to the logit ones presented. 
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the distribution of medical expenditures and thus has provided financial protection against the 
risk of particularly burdensome expenses. This indicates a compression of the distribution of 
OOP payments and reduced exposure to medical expenditure risk. 
Table 8: Effects of the Universal Coverage Scheme on conditional quantiles of positive 
household out-of-pocket medical expenditures per capita (OOP)  
 Conditional quantile OOP>0 distribution 
 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95 
Effect (Baht) -1.160* -15.75*** -30.17*** -50.26*** -89.85*** -217.2*** -536.2***
(.6322) (2.738) (3.934) (5.514) (9.165) (18.55) (37.02) 
Relative effect -.1360 -.2621 -.3162 -.3385 -.3646 -.4140 -.5078 
Sample size 39,993       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (not computed for relative effects). Relative effect is the absolute 
effect as a proportion of the prediction of the conditional quantile averaged over the treatment group in 
the post-treatment period under the counterfactual of no treatment. Quantile regressions include the 
control variables listed in Table A3, plus indicators of province, year and treatment/comparison group. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have estimated the impact on health care utilization and household out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures of a major health insurance reform in Thailand that extended coverage to one-
quarter of the population and secured universal coverage at levels of national income and 
aggregate spending on health below those of countries that have achieved that landmark hitherto. 
The reform reduced the likelihood that someone goes without formal treatment when sick by 
11% and increased inpatient admissions by 18%. These effects are largest for the elderly 
population. The increase in ambulatory care utilization is greatest for the poor and rural 
populations, while there is a significant impact on inpatient care only in the urban population. 
The absence of an effect on inpatient treatment in rural areas may be attributable to continued 
barriers to access. Although physical obstacles are not large with most of the population within 
50 km of a district hospital, beds are limited and capacity may easily be reached. Also pertinent is 
the failure of the reform to realize its ambition of redistributing medical manpower, particularly 
specialists and surgeons, to relatively understaffed hospitals in less densely populated areas. While 
these explanations are plausible, the result could also reflect a statistical limitation due to the 
greater difficulty of finding public sector worker controls in rural areas when estimating the 
impact on inpatient admission, which is a relatively infrequent event. There is no evidence of 
crowding out of private formal care. The reform made care more accessible to individuals 
previously financially deterred from utilization but removal of the public care price tag appears 
not to have induced users of private facilities to switch to the public sector, which may indicate 
continued quality and convenience gaps between public and private providers.27 
                                                            
27 This finding is subject to the caveat that the Universal Coverage Scheme does cover a minority of 
enrollees for care at private facilities. 
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In addition to raising access to health care, the reform reduced households’ exposure to medical 
expenditure risks. Mean household medical expenditures were reduced by one-third, as was the 
probability of spending more than 10% of the household budget on health care, while spending 
at the very top of the distribution of medical expenditures (i.e. the 95th conditional quantile) was 
reduced by one-half. The welfare gain from this reduction in risk exposure is potentially large 
relative to the modest cost (Finkelstein, McKnight, 2008). In addition, there may be health gains 
from the increased use of medical care, particularly the steep rise in inpatient treatment of the 
elderly. Gruber et al (2012) identify very large reductions in infant mortality arising from the 
reform and Wagstaff and Manachotphong (2012a) find that it reduced labour force 
nonparticipation due to illness or disability.28 Identification of impacts on more general health 
outcomes would better be achieved with a longer follow-up than the three years post 
implementation we have used to estimate effects on the more immediate outcomes of medical 
care use and expenditures. 
The experience of other countries shows that a major expansion of health insurance cover does 
not inevitably raise medical care utilization and reduce household OOP spending on health. US 
Medicare did achieve this (Finkelstein, 2007; Finkelstein, McKnight, 2008), as does Medicaid – 
health insurance for the poor – at least in one state (Finkelstein et al., 2012), but in Japan 
utilization was increased without any reduction in OOP spending (Kondo, Shigeoka, 2013). 
There is also evidence from China of increased utilization of medical care without any fall in 
OOP payments (Wagstaff et al., 2009), and even of greater exposure to very high medical 
expenses resulting from increased insurance cover, which seems to be attributable to the fee-for-
service payment of providers (Wagstaff, Lindelow, 2008). The opposite appears to have occurred 
in Mexico – a reduction in OOP health expenditures but no increase in utilization (King et al., 
2009; Barofsky, 2011). In Colombia, exposure to medical expenditure risk was reduced and 
preventive care increased, but there was no significant impact on the utilization of curative care 
(Miller et al., 2012). Set against this evidence, the example of Thailand suggests that the extent to 
which increased health insurance coverage both raises utilization and reduces OOP spending is 
contingent on the way in which the provision of medical care is financed and organized. 
The evidence we present on the shift in the location of public care from provincial to district 
hospitals is consistent with an effect of the gatekeeper system instituted by the reform. Much 
remains to be learned about exactly how this and other supply-side measures – a single 
purchasing agency, closed-end capitation budgets and prospective payment of hospitals for 
inpatient care – have been successful in realizing the promise of universal coverage with modest 
                                                            
28 Against the positive effects of the reform through reduced risk exposure and health, a full welfare 
analysis would take account of potential distortionary impacts on the labour market through reduced 
incentives for formal sector employment to obtain health insurance coverage. Wagstaff and 
Manachotphong (2012b) find only weak evidence of a reduction in formal sector employment for men and 
a positive impact on employment overall. 
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spending on health care that has increased but remains below 4% of GDP. The Thai experience 
confirms that effective universal coverage on a budget is feasible, but other middle income 
countries considering embarking on this major reform will be keen to learn exactly how it can be 
achieved.  
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1: Means of control variables by treatment status from Health and Welfare 
Surveys, 2001-2005  
 Treatment group
(Uninsured/MWS/ 
VHCS/UCS) 
Control group
(CSMBS) 
Demographicsa 
Male .473 .462
Age (years)  32.2 39.7
Urban .541 .802
Educationb 
None  .056 .021
Primary  .587 .256
Secondary  .319 .366
Post-secondary .038 .357
Employmentc 
Inactive .236 .297
Self-employed/family enterprise .361 .120
Employer .141 .025
Formal private  .233 .031
Public .030 .527
Occupationc 
None .319 .327
Production/equipment .079 .039
Agriculture/fishery .264 .165
Clerk/sales/services .248 .177
Professional/technical .090 .293
Incomed 
Real household per capita income 
(2005-Baht) 
4,093 11,194
% poor (in bottom income tertile) 30.1 10.8
Sample size 326,213 59,171
Notes: Sample weights applied. 
a Models are estimated using dummies to indicate age-sex categories.  
b For a child under 15 years old, the maximum education level per his/her household was used.  
c For a child under 15 years old, the highest employment/occupation category of any household member 
was assigned with the following rankings imposed: a) Employment sector: public > private > employer > 
self-employed / family enterprise > unemployed; and b) Occupation: professional / technical > clerk / 
sales / services > agriculture / fishery > production / equipment > no occupation.  
d Household money income per equivalent adult (OECD scale). Models include dummies to indicate 
income deciles. 
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Table A2: Sizes of sub-samples over which treatment effects in Table 3 & 4 are calculated 
 All Children Adult Elderly Rural Urban Poor Non-
Poor 
Reporting illness  152,842 44,717 88,409 19,716 73,197 79,645 46,617 106,225
Ambulatory care 29,411 7,908 14,474 7,029 15,067 14,344 10,996 18,415
Type of public care 16,664 4,589 7,514 4,561 9.634 7,030 7,391 9,273
Inpatient admission 152,809 44,712 88,387 19,710 73,181 79,628 46,611 106,198
IP district hospital 9,289 1,788 5,214 2,287 4,726 4,563 3,489 5,800
Notes: Sample sizes give the number of treated observations in the post-treatment period over which the 
treatment effects are averaged. The estimation samples are larger including control observations and 
treated observations in 2001. 
 
Table A3: Means of control variables from Socioeconomic Surveys 2000 and 2004  
 Treatment 
householdsa 
Comparison 
householdsb 
Urban .603 .853 
Household sizec 2.328 1.477 
Assets indexd   
bottom quintile .142 .058 
2nd bottom quintile .164 .094 
middle quintile .186 .132 
2nd top quintile .228 .231 
top quintile .280 .485 
Proportion of adult household members with  
No education .069 .003 
Primary education .566 .125 
Secondary education   .277 .363 
Post-secondary education .088 .509 
Head of household    
Male  .699 .699 
Age 50.6 42.3 
No education .073 .001 
Primary education .649 .099 
Secondary education   .200 .359 
Post-secondary education .078 .541 
Sample size 52,964 2,758 
Notes: Sample weights applied. 
a All households except those including a public sector employee or including only formal private sector 
employees.  
b Households including only public employees and their dependents.  
c Models also include the proportion of the household in 20 age-sex groups.  
d Assets index given by first principle component from analysis of the following items: house construction 
material, toilet, bed, gas and electric stoves, electric and cooking pots, water boiler, microwave oven, 
refrigerator, iron, electric fan, radio, television, video machine, washing machine, air conditioner, computer, 
line and mobile telephones, fluorescence lamp and light bulb, bicycle, motorcycle, car, truck and boat. Both 
treatment and comparison groups appear to have more than 20% in the top quintile due to the application 
of sample weights. 
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